Max Stirner: The Last Hegelian or the First Poststructuralist? by Koch, Andrew M & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Max Stirner: The Last Hegelian or the First 
Poststructuralist? 
ANDREW M. KOCH 
Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC 28608, USA 
ABSTRACT: Most political philosophers have argued that Stimer's concerns 
are compatible with those put forward by Hegel and by those influenced by 
Hegel. However, there is goodreason for disputing this view, and forunderstand- 
ing Stirner as an original thinker, whose ideas in some ways anticipated the 
concerns of contemporary post-structuralists. 
In 1845 Max Stimer published The Ego and His Own. The work, as a whole, can 
best be portrayed as a individualistic challenge to the legitimacy of the state. This 
work stands in stark contrast to other treatises on anarchism in the late nineteenth 
century. While the works of Kropotkin, Godwin, Proudhon, and others sought 
to create a philosophic basis for an anarchist position that retained the notion of 
community, Stirner's work defended an anarchist position based solely on the 
individual. Stirner argued that the individual ego is the measure of the world, 
which has led Stirner to be criticised by Hegelians, Marxists, and other anarchist 
writers. 
Stirner is most often discussed as part of the Hegelian tradition. Hegel's 
writings on philosophy, politics, and community had a profound impact on 
nineteenth and twentieth century political thought, particularly as the Hegelian 
tradition was interpreted by Karl Marx. Stirner's connection to this tradition is 
problematic, however, given his distrust of community. Nevertheless, Lawrence 
S. Stepelvich,echoing similar claims of David McLellan, argues that Stirner can 
be seen as a disciple of Hegel and perhaps even the 'last Hegelian." Other 
scholars have supported this view. Fredrich Engels and Karl Lowith treated 
Stirner's work as the culmination of the Hegelian conception of absolute spirit, 
although Karl Marx and Sidney Hook saw Stirner as a dangerous apologist for 
the failing bourgeoi~ie.~ 
The link between Stirner and the Hegelian tradition is an uncomfortable one. 
It is largely explained, I believe, by Stirner's attraction to some of the ideas of 
Anarchist Studies 5 (1 997): 95- 107 
O 1997 The White Horse Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Hegel while a student in Berlin. In addition, Stimer spent a period of his life 
socialising with the group known as the Young Hegelians. Yet, as Stepelvich 
recognised, Stirner does not employ any of the Hegelian concepts in his work. 
There are no references to the dialectic, no use of the Hegelian triad, and there 
is none of Hegel's technical language. Further, The Ego andHis Own can easily 
be interpreted as an attack on Hegel. Stepelvich explains his, and others, 
continued interpretation of Stimer as a Hegelian by employing Hegelian tech- 
nique; Stepelvich argues that as the last Hegelian Stirner completes the dialec- 
tical process by appearing as an anti-Hegelian. 
This essay will argue that attempts tounderstand Stirner within the structural 
confines of a Hegelian ontology cause a serious misreading of Stirner's work. 
While Stimer's discussion of the state and the political order does contain 
assumptions regarding human nature that are essentially individualist in nature, 
and might be seen as the culmination of spirit coming to self realisation as 'ego,' 
(an interpretation that can loosely be called Hegelian) there is something 
fundamentally different in Stimer's approach that sets him off from others in the 
Hegelian tradition. Stimer'scriticism of the political dominationof the statedoes 
not primarily have its origins in a discussion of human nature, and the heavy 
ontological language of the Hegelian system. The means by which he attacked 
the state are primarily epistemological in character. He is far more interested in 
the way state power gains legitimacy within a system of powerlknowledge than 
he is in challenging the Hegelian conception of the state as 'objective spirit.' 
To Stimer, the modem state legitimates itself through creating the illusion of 
fixed and essential ideas, and by convincing the population that it has 'discov- 
ered' immutable truth. Only by understanding Stimer's attack on what he called 
the 'fixed idea' will his position make any sense. In short, rather than being the 
'lastHegelian' Stirnermightjust aseasily be said tobe the 'firstpoststructuralist,' 
in offering the first modem epistemological critique of the way in which state 
power is legitimated through the nexus of powerlknowledge contained within 
the dominant culture. 
After summarising Stimer's claims about the illegitimacy of state power this 
paper will explore the epistemological basis of this claim. Specifically, Stirner's 
attack on the 'fixed idea' will be discussed with reference to some of the concepts 
used by contemporary poststructuralist writers. The poststructuralists assert that 
in any culture power legitimates itself through its connection to the validating 
mechanism for truth claims. This position effectively negates all transcendental 
truth claims by the state as well as calling into question the sanctity of collective 
decision making. Stirner shares this point of view, and the parallels will be 
elaborated in the discussion. 
I. INDIVIDUALISM, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN STATE 
For Max Stirner the state is an enemy.3 In the state individuals must sacrifice their 
labour, body, and freedom to a collective called the state (pp.111-116). The 
government needs money so it takes property and labour (pp.100, 115). It 
subordinates human beings to its will and crushes them if they resist. The state 
is, therefore, the enemy of all human beings. 
Stirner claimed that this is the case even with the development of modem 
institutions and the emergence of democratic political practice. Thus when 
Stirner spoke of the liberal political tradition, he spoke with nothing but disdain. 
The liberal revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not free 
the individual from the state but made the individual subservient to the state. 
Citizenship is the value promoted in the state. The liberal revolutions created the 
idea of the citizen and then subjected the people to it (p. 1 1 1). In what can be read 
as  an attack on the organic description of the state presented by Hegel, Stirner 
argued that 'social liberalism' seeks to generate the idea that the state has a body, 
not the individual (p.128). That body must be nurtured with all doing their part 
to support it. What Stirner called 'humane liberalism' (more in the tradition of 
Kant) sought to obliterate the concept of self and replace it with a generalised 
concept, 'Man,' to which all would owe their allegiance in the modem state 
(p.128). 
Both of these forms of liberalism create the dream of freedom, but the 
promise cannot be fulfilled. In fact, this freedom is not real, it lives in the realm 
of dreams (p.157). The real is what Stirner called 'ownness.' Owmess is 
personal and internal. It is not linked to the authority of the state. 'I am my own 
only when I am master of myself, instead of being mastered either by sensuality 
or by anything else (God, man, authority, law, State, Church) (p.169).' 
Owmess cannot be achieved within the two modem political traditions 
(socialism and liberalism). They reject the idea that the individual is unique. For 
Stirner the unique character of each human being is undeniable and critically 
important. This conclusion stems from a resolute ontological position. Stirner 
means the 'individual' in the strictest sense of the word. Only the individual has 
real being. Only organisms think, feel pain, breath, live and procreate. Each is, 
therefore, a repository of unique experience and ideas. To subordinate this 
uniqueness to any concept of state, collective union, or society that would negate 
this ontological reality would be an affront to reason. 
Even to say 'one' is unique because one is part of a unique group is to return 
to the safety of the herd and to sacrifice ontological independence (p.138). 
Stirner puts it very directly. 'Doubtless I have similarity with others, yet that 
holds good only for comparison or reflection; in fact I am incomparable, unique. 
My flesh is not their flesh, my mind is not their mind' (p.138). Any structure of 
authority resting on a concept that seeks to make the individual subordinate to 
a concept or idea beyond this principle is the enemy. 
Liberals do not see man, but only the concept 'Man' (p.173). They do not 
allow room for individuals. The individual man is refused, only the general 
human being is revered (p.205). The true individual must desecrate all that the 
state demands (p.184). Aware that the state has power, Stimer comments, 'It 
would be foolish to assert that there is no power above mine. Only the attitude 
that I take toward it will be quite another than that of the religious age: I shall be 
the enemy of every higher power' (p.184). 
The current system of morality that informs state practices is groundless. The 
danger for the individual within this social, political, legal, and philosophic 
construction cannot be overstated. Once any authority has the power to deter- 
mine the ideal to which life should be oriented the individual is in danger. Ideals 
get fixed within the laws, code, and practices of the state. Then ... 'the butchery 
goes on here in the name of the law, of the sovereign people, of God, etc! ' (p.205). 
Thus, it is impossible to separate Stirner's rejection of the state's authority 
from his comments about what he calls the 'fixed idea.' The fixed idea is the basis 
of modem morality and legality (p.43). Applied in the law, the construction of 
fixed ideas creates the basis for creating the label 'criminal behaviour' by which 
the state can justify its existence (p.238). 
Criticise the fixed idea and you will have to deal with aviolent anddangerous 
public that lives by the herd instinct. 'Touch the fixed idea of such afool, and you 
will at once have to guard your back against the lunatic's stealthy malice ... Every 
day now lays bare the cowardice and vindictiveness of these maniacs, and the 
stupid populace hurrahs for their crazy measures.' (p.43). 
Stimer's criticism of the state was unwavering. He denied the concept of 
authority because he denies that the state can have any firm footing on which to 
pass judgement. It creates the illusion he called the fixed idea, but Stirner denies 
that the fixed idea is anything but a fraud. The state generates power and illusion. 
It is, in reality, not constructed on the firm foundation of truth that it pretends. 
What is unique about Stimer's work is that it does not conform to the normal 
strategy employed by the other anarchist writers of the period. Most anarchist 
writers of this period began with a construction of human nature and then 
proceeded deductively. While there is some disagreement over how benign these 
authors saw the human character?generally human nature waspresented in such 
a way that the state could be seen as unnecessary, irrelevant, and intrusive. (This 
positive characterisation of human nature is also perceived to be one of the major 
criticisms against anarchism.) For example, in Mutual Aid Kropotkin asserts 
that, incontrast to Darwin, species that learn tocooperate are themost successful. 
In modem society institutions have disrupted the natural condition of human 
 being^.^ The same methodology is employed by Godwin and Proudhom6 Society 
is spontaneous and natural, and it is the formal institution of the state that 
prevents the natural condition from realising its potential. All of these conclu- 
sions, however, have their origins in a fixed view of human nature and human 
essence. Stirner rejects this strategy suggesting that it is not only flawed, but 
dangerous. 
11. STIRNER'S CRITIQUE OF TRANSCENDENTALISM AND THE 
FIXED IDEA 
To understand Stirner's attack on the authority of the state, his attitude toward 
the Western philosophic tradition must be examined. Stirner treated the Western 
conception of the 'idea' as an historical phenomenon. It has changed from the 
early Greek civilisation to the present. The ancient sophists understood that the 
mind was a weapon, a means to survival (p. 17). Truth was generated as the mind 
interacted with nature. But the world of nature was characterised by flux and 
change. It was not stable. Therefore, truth must also be in a constant state of 
transition. 
This is an unsettling position for philosophy. Philosophy has treated the 
inability to have fixed and eternal truth as a fundamental flaw in the human 
character. To overcome this weakness, Western philosophers since Plato have 
created the illusion of stability. This 'error' continues within the 'modem' 
traditions in philosophy as well. 
Modem culture has lost touch with the tradition that Stirner identified with 
sophism and scepticism. It has sought the safety of the 'fixed idea.' By a fixed 
idea Stimer means a concept, principle, or maxim that represents some aspect of 
the human character or that elaborates an ethical norm or standard which is not 
subject to historical circumstance. 'Fixed' means eternal, unchanging, and 
absolute. In the contemporary world, according to Stirner, we have adopted the 
belief in this folly. 
In the modem period humans beings have abandoned the sophist's notion 
that truth does not present itself in absolutes. Stirner lays much of the blame for 
this illusion at the doorstep of Christianity. It is the rise of Christianity that 
created the lie of 'spirit' and separated humans from contact with the world 
(pp.24-25). Spirit now becomes the focal point of human life and activity. Once 
we create this folly, the 'wheels in the head' of spirituality, we are beckoned to 
the fixed idea (p.43). 
When human beings invented the idea of 'spirit' in order to give themselves 
spirituality, the foundation was laid for the fixed idea. The spirit within the 
individual is perceived to be that which endures in the human being. The spirit 
transcends the body and the finite character of corporeal existence. But spiritu- 
ality teaches humans not to respect what is in the individual, but to care only for 
the image of 'Man' as a higher enduring essence (p.42). Human beings come to 
see each other as ghosts and spirits rather than flesh and blood. 
The spirituality of Christianity is mirrored and reinforced in the philosophic 
search for the fixed idea. Humanism is just the most recent metamorphosis of 
Christianity (p. 173). The common link is transcendentalism. While Stirner does 
not specifically mention Kant, the transcendental philosophy of Kant elaborates 
precisely what Stirner finds so offensive. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
develops a demonstration of how the mind is capable of engaging in thought 
outside the natural stimuli from the environment. Kant claims that reason alone 
can tell us that when we take away the sense impression left by an object it must 
still have extension in space and time? This demonstration of transcendental 
reasoning also leads to the conclusion that human beings cannot know essences 
from their contact with objects, but essences lie only in a transcendental realm 
beyond our reach. What Kant hoped to deliver with his project was a 'mode of 
knowing' concepts that are fixed and un~hanging.~ In constructing such a 
system, Kant has established a secular defence of the fixed idea and laid the 
foundation for modem humanism. 
In a similar fashion to Christian thought, Kant's creation of a transcendental 
foundation for thought establishes the basis for a universalist morality. Adding 
only the assumption of 'free will' as the first principle of morality, Kant was then 
prepared to give his universalist formulation of the Categorical Imperative: 'Act 
as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a general law of 
na t~ re , ' ~  and the more specific Practical Imperative: 'Act so as to treat man, in 
your own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never merely 
as a means.'1° It is these fixed, transcendental claims that lay the groundwork for 
Kant's universalist claims in law and politics. 
Law can be constructed according to transcendentally conceived notions that 
have no relation to experience, historical condition, or social custom. Reached 
transcendentally, conclusions regarding the law are not subject to critique based 
on any experiential knowledge. Morality and law have been divorced from actual 
lived sensation. The result is that the fixed transcendental idea now has the power 
to shape human life. From an anarchist perspective, real human beings are now 
under the power of that which is only an aberration. This is precisely how Stirner 
approached the issue. 
This naive transcendentalism also produces political consequences. Univer- 
sal ethics also provides the basis for a universal conception of human history. In 
the case of Kant, it is argued that human beings have the same basic character- 
istics, especially the equal power to engage in reasoning. Based on this assump- 
tion, a transcendental moral system can be 'discovered' through reason by which 
individuals can order their lives. Further, if human beings have the same 
character and are subject to the same unchanging, a priori principles of action, 
it is now possible to create a universal society and a universal history based on 
that fact.ll 
Stirner rejected such a strategy. It moves in precisely the wrong direction. 
The type of universal society described by the liberalism of either Kant or Marx 
is an affront to the 'ownness' that can only be within the individual. What is 
needed, according to Stirner, is not a society of men, but a union of egos (p.179). 
Only such a union could really validate the distinct character of each individual. 
Only such an organisation could really respect the differences represented by 
each unique being. 
111. POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
PROBLEM WITH THE FIXED IDEA 
The stress on the uniqueness of the individual is a cornerstone of Stirner's work, 
but it is not the complete picture. Stirner's confrontation with the fixed idea 
represents a confrontation with all philosophic and theological transcendental- 
ism in the Western tradition. The fixed idea is a maxim, principle, or standpoint 
that has determined us (p.63). The fixing of ideas makes us prisoners to thought 
rather than creators of thought. Transcendentalism takes the fixed idea and then 
tries to shape the world in its image. Ultimately the 'idea' has subjected the 
human being to itself (p.43). 
Stirner's epistemological position is not an isolated aberration. His argument 
is a modem formulation of an epistemological attack on the Western tradition in 
metaphysics and philosophy that extends from the ancient sophists to the 
twentieth century. To fully understand what Stirner is trying to say it is useful to 
examine what comes after Stimer in this tradition. Of critical importance to this 
task is Fredrich Nietzsche. While there is some debate over whether or not 
Nietzsche was familiar with Stirner's work, there is no doubt the two authors 
shared an epistemological concern over the integrity of the metaphysical 
foundation of the Western tradition.12 
Nietzsche shared Stirner's distaste for both transcendentalism and the 
Christian tradition in morality. What Nietzsche adds to the discussion is the 
genealogical method by which the material origins of moral belief can be 
identified as products of history and culture.I3 For Nietzsche transcendental 
morals set human beings against themselves, denying their true natures. As 
Stirner put it, what aperson does is human, not because it conforms to a concept, 
but by the very fact that a human does it (p. 178). 
For Stirner, the state is founded on the lack of independence (p.224). It is the 
condition of living in the herd (p.223). This claim is echoed in Nietzsche who 
argued that the state is created by the superfluous people.I4 The herd creates 
morality against the strong and independent.ls The herd invents the myth of 
equality and heralds its god as the 'categorical imperative.'I6It is the death of real 
people, creative individuals capable of excellence, innovation, and, as Nietzsche 
states in The Use and Abuse of History, the ability to engage in dialogue with 
giants over the course of history." 
For both Stirner and Nietzsche, when the transcendental masks that hide 
human beings from themselves are stripped away 'power' is revealed. But here 
power must be understood in a very specific sense and can only have meaning 
in relation to a general notion of property. To Stirner, private property is a 
reflection of personal power (p.256). Personal property is the measure of 
individual power. Such measure is upset within the state because of the rules and 
regulations that make no one's property their own (pp.25 1-52). True property is 
the expression of unique individual power. To Nietzsche, property, broadly 
construed, would include the creative acts of individuals and also represent the 
measure of the character. Acts are our own. They are products of uniqueness, not 
to be diminished by the collective. Fixed andgeneralised concepts diminish what 
is our own. 
Stirner, Nietzsche, and the contemporary poststructuralists assert a similar 
criticism of the fixed idea. All deny the possibility of demonstrating the validity 
of fixed, transcendental, universals. There can be no demonstration of universals 
that cannot be shown to have its validity rest on the assumed validity of another 
universal. With no validating mechanism other than the connection to other 
transcendental assertions back through history, such texts have no original 
moment in which theirtruth can be verified.I8 All such fixed ideas, therefore, lack 
epistemological validity. 
In Stirner the fixed idea is responsible for the fundamental moral and political 
error that has been perpetrated on individuals by the state. However, Stirner 
never developed the language to go into greater depth on the construction, 
functioning, and consequences of the fixed idea. Language for such an inquiry 
is introduced by Nietzsche, but canied to its full fruition with the poststructuralists. 
In The Will to Power Nietzsche echoes something mentioned by Stirner. In 
The Ego and His Own Stirner recalled a time in which the mind confronts the 
world to make sense of it for survival (p.18). Nietzsche gave a naturalist 
interpretation to this claim, suggesting the human need to interpret the world as 
an act necessary for survival.19 But Nietzsche makes it very clear that 'interpre- 
tation' is something linked to history, context, and need. Perceptions, logic, and 
reason, developed because they were useful for life, not because they were true 
or accurate portrayals of a transcendental reality.2O Thus, like Stirner, Nietzsche 
claimed there can be no basis for maintaining the belief in fixed ideas. 
Nietzsche also confronts this issue in a slightly different manner in The Use 
and Abuse of History. There Nietzsche makes reference to the problem of 
epistemological closure in speaking of the 'shifting horizon of truth.'2' Episte- 
mological closure is created when an object is given a stable identity. The 
representation of objects always commits an error of omission. Something is 
always left out in order to close the system of identities. If there are only 
interpretations of the world, there is no fixed truth and no possibility of stable 
repre~entation.~~ A priori truths are only provisional assumption^.^' The result of 
all this is the conclusion that rather than having only one truth, the world is seen 
to have countless  meaning^?^ 
The contemporary movement in French philosophy known as 
poststructuralism pursues the problem of epistemological closure in its critique 
of 'representation.' Representation is a structural illusion~plain 2%reated by 
closing off a concept from its multifaceted meaning. This epistemological 
closure grants power to texts through creating the illusion of stability. Stability 
generates a clear boundary between meaning and n0nmeaning.2~ It is precisely 
this gesture in the act of generating concepts that produces the fundamental error 
of the fixed idea. From the perspective of Stirner, Nietzsche, the poststructuralists, 
and the sophists, such stability is epistemologically unsound. Its value is 
political. Fixing a concept or idea within a closed system of identities and 
meanings lends authority to utterances. This process is a means of generating 
power. 
What Stirner, Nietzsche, and the poststructuralists claim is that the authority 
generated by the fixed idea is not the authority of truth, but the authority of power. 
The fixed idea is a fiction created because it legitimates power. Fixed ideas do 
not have transcendental validity. They have only a utility function in the nexus 
of power/knowledge. As a utility, fixed ideas grant authority to words. Transcen- 
dentalism in speech is what causes both Stirner and Derrida to identify such fixed 
systems with theol~gy.~' To both of these authors, truth must be treated as 
something historical. 
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE SELF 
The fixed idea provides the illusion that there are fixed universals around which 
human life can be constructed. It generates a belief in stable representations and 
expectations that are 'naturally' human. Fixing a stable representation of the 
human being is precisely what Stirner meant by the generalised concept 
'Man.'(p.75) Once the human being is represented as a stable objective concept 
he or she becomesreplaceable.28Asobjectified subjects, the 'I' has lost its power. 
There is only a mass. As Jacques Derrida put it, the process of objectification 
tums a world of unique individuals into the material for production units, police 
computers, and concentration As Todd May describes the 
poststructuralist project, all assertions of human essence, even humanism, must 
be reje~ted.~' 
As is the case with the poststructuralists, Stirner also rejected the possibility 
that any totalising concept of 'Man' could do justice to the unique character of 
each individual. What links this position to the criticism of the state is the 
relationship between the construction of truth and the conditions of power in 
society. If truth is an historical construction and if it does not have any link to a 
transcendental ahistorical universal 'law' or condition, then the structures from 
which truth is generated cannot be separated from the institutions of power which 
make them p~ssible.~' 
Hence, Stimer draws the only logical conclusion possible based on his 
premises, that it is the state that maintains the generalised concept, or ideal, to 
which the individual must conform, and it is the state, therefore, that must be 
resisted. Power attaches identities to people. Power imposes a law of truth that 
ties people to power.32 Hence, Michel Foucault concluded that the real political 
battle is not over the content of truth, but over the status of claims to truth.33 This 
is precisely what Stirner recognised in rejecting the 'fixed idea.' 
The state reinforces the fixed idea by imposing a code of conduct and 
discipline on the population. The generalised concept 'Man' is the bearer of the 
idea of normalcy. Normalcy provides the foundation for the code of di~cipl ine.~~ 
Discipline takes the form of control over individual bodies. It is the state that 
carries out the imposition of what humanistic culture demands. 
Intellectuals have been the bearers of the liberal humanist tradition, and can 
be identified with its oppression. Denying the possibility of the transcendental 
removes the intellectual from the privileged place granted since Plato's Repub- 
lic. Since intellectuals can no longer be seen as the bearers of truth, they are seen 
by Foucault as occupying a specific place in the p~werhierarchy.~~ They are the 
legitimators of the totalising concepts within the structure of power, whether in 
the name of theology or science. 
At this point epistemological critique and political commentary come 
together. If 'I' am not the flesh and blood, thought and desire, that is someone 
else's 'I,' then I must be unique. According to Stimer, my value is that I am an 
'I' (pp.365-66). If this is the case then the entire Enlightenment project, what 
Stirner would include as both social liberalism and humane liberalism, must be 
mistaken. 'I' cannot be generalised. What is important in the understanding of 
'I' is not universal but unique. The 'I' must generate a politics of 'difference.' 
A politics built around what is different and unique is all that can emerge 
based on the antifoundational premises of Stirner, Nietzsche, and the 
poststructuralists. Thus when Stirner denounces the state and calls for a 'Union 
of Egos' in its place (p.179), it is a claim in favour of respecting the 'I' not the 
generalised concept 'Man'. Respect for difference creates a positive political 
stance toward the individual. It does not degrade human nature by reducing it to 
the lowest common denominator. It puts human beings beyond the grasp of any 
single concept. 
Any assertion that human beings canbe definedby any assertion of 'essence,' 
'identity' or 'human nature' must be rejected. Critique does not set dogmas. It 
crushes fixed ideas and opposes systems (p. 147). What is designated as gener- 
alised essence is not 'me,' but is only a name (p.366). I am at every moment 
creating myself (p. 150). Or, as Michel Foucault put it, each life is a work of art 
in pr~gress.)~ 
CONCLUSION 
The basis of Stimer's claims was epistemological. Therefore, the assertion that 
he is the culmination of the Hegelian tradition cannot be sustained. Hegel's 
defence of the state as the reflection of universal spirit was, to Stimer, just another 
fantastic aberration in order to justify the state's domination. In the Hegelian 
state, there can be no '1'. Nothing could be more abhorrent to Stirner. He is far 
more an anti-Hegelian than, as some authors suggest, the pinnacle of the 
Hegelian tradition. 
Is Stirner the f ~ s t  poststructuralist? In a sense, this is an absurd question that 
only has meaning within the confines of linear history. Stirner is part of a 
perspective that goes back to the earliest Western civilisations. The sophists 
understood that the mind was to be used as a means to a pleasant life, not to 
become a source of tyranny against the body (p.17). With transcendentalism 
came a transformation in philosophy. As Foucault described it, after Plato, the 
idea of true and false discourse replaced open inquiry.37 The idea of fixed and 
universal truth had supplanted dynamic critique. The stage was set for the folly 
that has been Western philosophy. 
Stimer, Nietzsche, and contemporary poststructuralism all share this view. 
Further, they are concerned for what this condition of knowledge means in social 
life. They believe that any fixed representation of the human character is both 
epistemologically flawed and politically dangerous. Ideas cannot be fixed. Truth 
is plural, dynamic, and contingent. When the human being is ascribed a fixed and 
general nature, rather than being protected under the 'Rights of Man' suggested 
by liberal humanism, they lose their unique identities and become objects of 
domination. The transcendental ideal pits the body against the intellect. We 
become slaves to the conceivable posing as truth. Difference is negated in favour 
of the general. The value of true individualism cannot be realised where the 'I' 
does not represents a unique set of experiences and ideas. 
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